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Abstract Adam Elga has presented an anti-thermodynamic process as a counte-
rexample to Lewis’s default semantics for counterfactuals. The outstanding reac-
tion of Jonathan Schaffer and Boris Kment is revisionary. It sacrifices Lewis’s aim of 
defining causation in terms of counterfactual dependence. Lewis himself suggested 
an alternative: «counter-entropic funnybusiness» should make for dissimilarity. But 
how is this alternative to be spelled out? I discuss a recent proposal: include special 
science laws, among them the laws of thermodynamics. Although the proposal fails, 
it serves to uncover the limits of Elga’s example.
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1. Introduction
Adam Elga has presented an intriguing counterexample to Lewis’s 
default semantics for counterfactuals.1 I discuss a recent proposal how to 
deal with Elga’s example. To summarize Lewis’s semantics: his truth-con-
dition for counterfactuals is: 
1  Elga, 2001.
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A counterfactual pð → q is non-vacuously true iff some p and q - world 
is more similar to the actual one than any p and not-q-world.2 
Following Elga, I will talk as if there were a set of closest p-worlds. 
For the deterministic case, Lewis presents a default similarity ordering 
of worlds: 
(1) It is of first importance to avoid big, widespread, diverse violations 
of law [big miracles]. 
(2) It is of second importance to maximize the spatio-temporal region 
throughout which perfect match of particular fact prevails. 
(3) It is of third importance to avoid even small, localized simple viola-
tions of law [small miracles]. 
(4) It is of little or no importance to secure approximate similarity of 
particular fact, even in matters that concern us greatly.3
2. Elga’s Counterexample to Lewis 
I sketch Elga’s counterexample to these criteria. He considers 
«At 8:00, Gretta cracked open an egg onto a hot frying 
pan. According to the analysis, are the following counter-
factuals true?
[C1] If Gretta hadn’t cracked the egg, then at 8:05 there 
wouldn’t have been a cooked egg on the pan.
[C2] If Gretta hadn’t cracked the egg, then at 7:55 she 
wouldn’t have taken an egg out of her refrigerator».4 
Consider two competitors for closest non-cracking worlds: Lewis’s 
favourite W
2
 perfectly matches the actual world W
1
 until shortly before 
8:00. At that point, a small miracle occurs such as to prevent the egg 
from being cracked. Then W
2
 develops according to the laws such as to 
never again perfectly match the actual world. W
3
, in contrast, differs from 
2  cf. Lewis, 1986, 41.
3  Lewis, 1986, 47–48.
4  Elga, 2001, S314.
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the actual world before 8:00. The egg is not cracked and not taken out of 
the refrigerator at 7:55. Some time after 8:00 W
3
 converges to the actual 
world by dint of a small miracle. Lewis insists that the W
3
 - strategy is not 
feasible. For any normal event leaves many and varied traces. It would 
need many and varied unlawful events, a big miracle, to suppress these 
traces.5 So the asymmetry is this: certain divergence worlds are better 
candidates for closeness than any convergence worlds. 
Elga sets out to show that pace Lewis there are candidate worlds for W
3
 
that need nothing but a small miracle.6 He confines his discussion to the 
framework of deterministic statistical mechanics. A physical state can be 
completely described by the positions and momenta of particles. Starting 
from the egg in the pan at 8:05, Elga contrasts a normal future devel-
opment to a thermodynamically atypical future development. The latter 
reverses the actual forward-directed development of the egg between 
8:00 and 8:05: the egg uncooks and jumps back into the shell. The 
reversed development is extremely unstable. Consider its initial state: 
the closest neighbours to this state in phase space are states which dif-
fer from it just in a small local group of molecules. It needs only a tiny 
change at 8:05, a small miracle, to proceed to one of these states. But the 
tiny difference very quickly spreads such as to give rise to a completely 
different, thermodynamically normal development. A tiny change leads to 
a completely different result. Now an analogous situation can be achieved 
by running the symmetrical laws backwards: the actual past development 
of the egg is a precise mirror image of the atypical future development. 
From the viewpoint of statistical mechanics, both are equally atypical. 
Judging the situation of the cooked egg by statistical mechanics alone, 
we should expect entropy to increase towards the past. Take again the 
imagined future-directed development of the egg jumping back into the 
shell. Now imagine a slightly varied initial situation. A completely dif-
ferent, thermodynamically normal future development ensues. Entropy 
increases towards the future. The same goes for the past. Take a possi-
ble situation which is slightly different from the actual one immediately 
before 8:05. Instead of the actual past of the egg (cracking and cooking), 
5  Lewis, 1986, 47.
6  Elga, 2001, S318.
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we get a completely different, thermodynamically atypical past develop-
ment. Elga envisages a process of «reversed rotting»: a normal future 
development of the egg is reversed and projected into the past. A coni-
form «infected region» comprises this complete development from the 
very distant past up to the point of convergence at 8:05. In the distant 
past, the infected region was huge.7 But it rapidly shrank and gave way to 
thermodynamically normal developments up to the small miracle imme-
diately before 8:05.8 The egg has never been taken out of the refrigera-
tor, never been cracked. Nevertheless, the thermodynamically reversed 
development eventually approximates the actual development. A small 
miracle administered immediately before 8:05 yields perfect match. Since 
this match is perfect, it comprises all the alleged traces of the cracking. 
As it seems, we cannot rule out that the Elga world is closer than all 
competing non-cracking worlds. It perfectly abides by the actual fun-
damental laws of nature except for a small miracle, and it counters the 
perfect pre-antecedent match Lewis’s candidate worlds exhibit by perfect 
post-antecedent match. If W
3
 is closer than its competitors, for instance 
because the end of the world is not far away, Lewis’s criteria have the 
wrong counterfactuals come out true, for instance the intuitively false 
(C2) If Gretta hadn’t cracked the egg, then at 7:55 she wouldn’t have 
taken an egg out of her refrigerator. 
If W
3 
is as close as W
1
, neither C1 nor C2 are true. So Lewis’s similarity 
metrics grossly misses our common counterfactual verdicts. 
3. The Revisionary Reply: Writing Causal Dependency into the 
Similarity Metrics 
Jonathan Schaffer provides the following strategy against Elga: one 
should only maximize match in facts from regions causally independent 
of whether or not the antecedent obtains: 
7  Why is the infected region coniform? Imagine a thermodynamically abnormal re-
gion with future developments of the egg-jumps-back-into-the-shell-sort. Varying a few 
molecules at some point within this region initiates an «infection» by thermodynamically 
normal developments which rapidly grows as the molecules begin to interact with others. 
Elga’s region which grows towards the past is a mirror-image of such an infection. 
8  Elga, 2000, S323.
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(1c) It is of the first importance to avoid big miracles. 
(2c) It is of the second importance to maximize the region of perfect 
match, from those regions causally independent of whether or not the 
antecedent obtains. 
(3c) It is of the third importance to avoid small miracles. 
(4c) It is of the fourth importance to maximize the spatiotemporal 
region of approximate match, from those regions causally independent 
of whether or not the antecedent obtains.9 
Boris Kment has recently presented a version of this strategy in terms 
of sameness of explanatory history.10 On balance, in spite of criticism,11 
I deem the Schaffer-Kment strategy the most promising way of dealing 
with Elga’s counterexample and other recent revivals of the future sim-
ilarity objection.12 
However, from an orthodox Lewisian viewpoint, the Schaffer-Kment 
strategy seems unattractive. It forestalls Lewis’s aim of defining causation 
in terms of counterfactual dependence. Such a definition is the bold-
est and most straightforward version of a strand in the philosophy of 
causation which has grown ever more important in recent years.13 But if 
causal dependence is written into the very metrics which determines the 
truth of counterfactuals, this is irreconcilable with the aim of defining it 
without circularity.14
9  Schaffer, 2004, 305.
10  Kment, 2006.
11  cf. Noordhof, 2005.
12  At least within a nearness semantics as Lewis presents it, cf. Schaffer, 2004, Wasser-
man, 2006.
13  cf. the literature in Hitchcock, 2011, 230–231. To be sure, not anyone working on 
this project aims at a non-circular definition of causality. 
14  Admittedly, Schaffer’s approach is Lewisian in sharing Lewis’ truth-condition for 
counterfactuals and most of Lewis’ four-part lexical similarity ordering. Moreover, far 
from announcing his ideas as un-Lewisian, Schaffer takes great pains at reconciling the 
use of causal terms with Lewis’ metaphysical ambitions: 
«Might one adopt both a causal independence account of counterfactuals, and a counter-
factual account of causation? Is the resulting circularity problematic? Ontologically speak-
ing, I see nothing problematic here. The truth about both counterfactuals and causality 
still supervenes on the arrangement of events. Or at least, nothing here contradicts that. 
The causal and counterfactual facts can still, for instance, be regarded as «co-superve-
nient» upon a Humean base. If there were a problem, it could be a conceptual problem. 
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So if one looks for a Lewisian strategy of answering Elga’s challenge 
(not taking into account other new variants of the future similarity objec-
tion), it might seem worthwile to look for one which does not write out-
right causal relationships into the similarity metrics. 
4. A Conservative Proposal: Writing Special Science Laws into the 
Similarity Metrics 
4.1 Summary of the Proposal 
Lewis himself hints at such a strategy. Bennett reports his reaction to 
Elga’s counterexample: 
«The worlds that converge onto worlds like ours are 
worlds with counter-entropic funnybusiness. I think the 
remedy – which doesn’t undercut what I’m trying to do – is 
to say that such funny-business, though not miraculous, 
makes for dissimilarity in the same way miracles do».15 
Lewis suggests that counter-entropic regions should play a role compa-
rable to the role of miracles: Worlds like Elga’s W
3 
are disqualified as can-
didates for being closest antecedent worlds because they exhibit count-
er-entropic funny-business. But how is «funnybusiness» to be spelled 
out as a general criterion? Jeffrey Dunn has recently presented such a 
criterion which pays due respect to the intuitive weirdness of counter-en-
tropic processes.16 While Lewis’ original metrics draws on fundamental 
laws, Dunn also takes into account the laws of the special sciences, 
One would lose linear definability – no ordered chain of definitions could wind from the 
Humean base up through the conceptual superstructure. But perhaps linear definabili-
ty was never in the offing. Because concepts do not have definitions». (Schaffer, 2004, 
307–308.) 
Schaffer intimates that preserving Lewis’ conception of supervenience matters more than 
the non-circular definability of causality by counterfactuals: the truth about both causality 
and counterfactuals supervenes on the mosaic of events; but there is no non-circular defi-
nition of concepts like causality.
15  Quoted in Bennett, 2003, 296.
16  I note in passing that Dunn misconstrues Elga’s argument. He thinks that Elga just 
takes the velocity reverse of the actual scenario at 8:05: the cooked egg sitting in the pan 
(Dunn, 2011, 80). But it is clear that the reversal of all velocities constituting the scenario 
cannot be reached by a small miracle. 
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among them «lawlike relations that are not entailed by the fundamen-
tal laws».17 In his Lewisian view, «a special science law is a theorem in 
the best systemization of … phenomena when we limit ourselves to the 
vocabulary of a special science».18 He gives laws of the special sciences 
fourth importance, demoting Lewis’s fourth criterion (concerning the 
role of approximate match) to fifth importance: 
(4´) It is of the fourth importance to avoid violation of the special sci-
ence laws.19 
The Elga world is disqualified as a candidate for closeness. It violates 
the laws of thermodynamics, construed as a special science. Briefly, 
Dunn invokes the second law of classical thermodynamics: heat cannot 
spontaneously flow from a hotter location to a cooler location.20 Yet that 
is what Elga’s reverse process would amount to. The backwards rotting 
egg would have to absorb heat from its relatively cool surroundings in 
order to end in the pan at cooking temperature. Lewis’s candidate worlds 
abide by the second law of thermodynamics while the Elga world violates 
it. So the former are closer according to Dunn’s criteria. 
I think that Dunn’s proposal deserves closer attention independently 
of dissolving Elga’s problem. Counterfactuals play an important role in 
the special sciences (for instance in functional biology.21 One may won-
der whether the role of special science laws in such counterfactuals is 
exhausted by Lewis’s criteria:
«The main reason for adding in all the special science 
laws is that in the standard context the similarity that spe-
cial science laws add to a world matter for the evaluation 
of counterfactuals. For instance, we seem to think that the 
following is true: 
[C3] If the apple farmers’ crop yield had outrun demand, 
the price of apples would have gone down. 
17  Dunn, 2011, 73.
18  Dunn, 2011, 88.
19  Dunn, 2011, 84.
20  For a more detailed modern formulation cf. Dunn, 2011, 82. 
21  cf. Lange, 2004.
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Now, if we go to worlds where the antecedent is made 
true by a small fundamental miracle and where there are 
no other violations of fundamental law or thermodynamic 
laws, we might only be left with worlds where the economic 
laws hold. If the fundamental laws together with the ther-
modynamic laws entail that the special science laws stay 
fixed, then this is certainly the case, and so putting them 
in the similarity metric is superfluous (though it doesn’t do 
any harm). But this might not be the case. And if the ther-
modynamic laws and the fundamental laws aren’t enough 
to entail the special science laws, then it seems to be a 
good thing to have them in our similarity metric».22 
In my critical discussion of Dunn’s approach, I will proceed as follows: 
in the next section, I will point out several problems of integrating special 
science laws into Lewis’s metrics. In section (4), I draw a lesson from my 
criticism: Dunn’s proposal ultimately fails. Yet as long as there might be 
fundamental laws which underlie the thermodynamic asymmetry, there 
is hope for Lewis’s original metrics. 
4.2 Criticism: Why Special Science Laws Should Not Be Written into 
the Similarity Metrics 
My first three queries concern the special science solution in general, 
the fourth its application to Elga’s counterexample. 
(4.2.1.) I begin with Dunn’s own independent motivation for integrating 
the special science laws, the intuitively true apple price counterfactual: 
(C3) If the apple farmers’ crop yield had outrun demand, the price of 
apples would have gone down. 
I take Dunn’s basic argument to be the following: Lewis maintains that 
fundamental laws do not allow for exceptions.23 Thus, the closest mira-
cle-worlds (relative to the actual fundamental laws) are worlds where at 
least some actual fundamental laws are no laws. But as witnessed by the 
apple counterfactual, the special laws of economics obtain. 
22  Dunn, 2011, 81 ann. 9.
23  Lewis, 1986, 45.
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Assume the varied fundamental laws in the closest situation where 
the antecedent of (C3) is true entail the laws of economics. Then (C3) is 
ensured by Lewis’s original metrics and does not motivate Dunn’s amend-
ment. Assume that the special science laws at stake are not entailed by 
the fundamental laws. Still we do not need (4´) to account for (C3). In 
a Lewisian account, the special science laws must somehow supervene 
on fundamental laws and particular matters of fact. In dealing with the 
counterfactual supposition, we minimally revise the fundamental laws. 
And we hold onto perfect match in particular matters of fact as far as rec-
oncilable with the antecedent and the revised laws. Provided the revised 
laws and particular matters of fact support the special science laws, the 
latter are preserved. This is why (C3) seems acceptable. The revised fun-
damental laws and particular matters of fact are minimally modified by 
the everyday situation of the crop yield outrunning demand. The result 
also supports the usual functional relationship of supply and demand. 
Just imagine an increase in apple supply. We hold fixed (the fundamental 
facts underlying) the rational behaviour of apple traders. They will react 
in their usual way: sellers compete in prices, there are few buyers, the 
price will go down. Things would be different if the antecedent required 
a substantial change in actual matters of fact: a change such that actual 
matters of fact do not any longer support certain special science laws. 
Dunn does nothing to show that in such a situation, we would hold onto 
the special science laws in question. In contrast, the arguments to come 
point in the opposite direction. 
However, an argument by Frigg and Hoefer seems to support Dunn’s 
claim. They reject the counterfactual 
[C4] If the physics of our world was vastly different from what it is, 
then the chance for heads should be different too!24 
Frigg and Hoefer are silent on the issue of special science laws. Yet 
we may suspect that there is a comparable regularity involved. For coin-
like set-ups, the general chance of a particular outcome is 1/n where n 
is the number of sides of the coin-like object. To Frigg and Hoefer, the 
24  Hoefer and Frigg, 2010, 365.
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sort of general patterns which underpin objective chances might obtain 
in worlds which are microphysically very different from ours: 
«…these sorts of patterns may obtain even in worlds with 
radically different micro-laws. Imagine a universe in which 
matter is a continuum and obeys something like the laws of 
Cartesian physics; imagine that coins exist in this universe 
and are tossed repeatedly. Despite the basic physics being 
very different, suppose it turns out that the overall pattern 
of outcomes of rolls/tosses of such n-sided objects in the 
continuum universe’s HM [Humean mosaic] is very similar 
to the pattern in our universe. What would the chance of 
heads be in the continuum universe? Clearly it would be 
given by the 1/n rule, since this is the best rule relative to 
the HM, irrespective of the microconstitution of matter».25 
However, we must distinguish two readings of the consequent. In one 
reading, «heads» means «heads within the undisturbed social practice of 
tossing a coin». It is a necessary feature of the undisturbed social prac-
tice that the coin is fair, i.e. the 1/n rule holds. Then we may read the 
counterfactual as subject to the following implicit qualification: 
(C5) If the physics of our world was vastly different from what it is, 
then, if there were a chance of a coin being tossed at all, the chance for 
heads would not be different. 
Assuming import-export [(pð→(qð→r) ⊃ (p&q)ð→r)], this boils down to 
(C5´) If the physics of our world was vastly different from what it is and 
there was a chance of a coin being tossed at all, the chance for heads 
would not be different. 
(C5´) seems true as the consequent involves Ch(heads/a coin is tossed 
within our undisturbed social practice). 
If, in contrast, we just consider the coin as a physical object which is 
subject to a certain kinematics, I see no reason to accept 
(C6) If the physics of our world was vastly different from what it is, 
then the chance for heads would be the same. 
25  Hoefer and Frigg, 2010, 368.
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And (C6) is what Dunn would need for Frigg and Hoefer’s observations 
to support his case. Still I would join Frigg and Hoefer in rejecting (C4). 
The reason will become obvious in a moment. 
I do not deny that, in order to evaluate counterfactuals within a special 
science, the laws of this science must be upheld. But I do not see why, 
say, biology should require to uphold the laws of economics. Rather any 
special science may create its own non-default context. But this has no 
impact on Lewis’s default similarity ordering. If one eschews non-default 
contexts for special sciences, alternatively one may impose criteria of 
selection. These criteria select precisely those counterfactuals which are 
relevant to a special science among all the counterfactuals which are 
true by default. For instance, biologists may be interested in selecting 
antecedent events which could have formed part of normal biological 
functioning (although the closest world is one where they have come 
about by a small miracle). 
(4.2.2) The Elga world is described in terms of statistical mechanics. 
Dunn confesses his uncertainty how the latter relates to thermodynamics: 
«An extremely tentative view about the relation between 
the two is that statistical mechanics is an attempt to explain 
how we get the special science laws of thermodynamics, given 
certain fundamental physical laws. It is important to note 
that I am attempting to construe classical thermodynamics 
as a special science, not statistical mechanics».26 
Dunn’s treatment raises a question: assume certain laws of the spe-
cial sciences can be reduced to more fundamental laws and facts. What 
should the place of these laws in the similarity ordering be? 
One may deny that this is a problem, arguing as follows: assume a 
special science law is entailed by the fundamental laws. For the special 
science law to be violated, the fundamental laws must be violated as well 
but not vice versa. So in case of reducibility, Dunn’s criterion yields the 
following result: a world where the fundamental laws are violated but 
26  Dunn, 2011, 82.
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the special science laws are not is closer, other things being equal, than 
a world where the special science laws are also violated. 
To elaborate the problem, I begin with an example of Kment’s. He discusses the 
counterfactual dependence of particular facts on fundamental laws: 
«[C7] If (Law of Gravitation) had not been a law, then 
events would still have at least approximately conformed 
to it.
No one I asked believed that this counterfactual was 
true… 
[C8] If the master law [comprising all fundamental laws] 
had not been a law, the history of the world would still have 
been very similar to what it was actually like».27 
Kment suggests that there is an explanatory relationship between laws 
and particular matters of fact. This relationship makes us reject (C7) and 
(C8). In the closest counterfactual situation where the actual explanans 
does not obtain, we do not hold onto the explanandum either. I do not 
commit myself to this view of explanation. Yet I maintain that there is 
a parallel counterfactual dependence of special science laws on laws 
they can be reduced to. I remain neutral as to whether this dependence 
ultimately enforces the Schaffer-Kment amendment. There is a close 
parallel to the example of Frigg and Hoefer. They accept an explanatory 
relationship as envisaged by Kment: «…there is the pervasive intuition 
that if a macro result can be derived from a more fundamental theory, 
there is explanation».28
According to Frigg and Hoefer, there is an explanatory relationship 
between microphysics and the macroscopic chance of getting heads in 
a coin toss. Now by Kment’s lights, in a situation where the microphys-
ics is different, we do not hold onto what is explained by it. So on the 
one hand, we do not have any reason to hold onto the chance of heads. 
27  Kment, 2006, 280, 281.
28  Frigg and Hoefer, 2010, 366.
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On the other hand, however, there is no reason why it must be different 
from the way they actually are. Consider again: 
(C4) If the physics of our world was vastly different from what it is, 
then the chance for heads should be different too. 
We do not hold onto facts explained by the actual microphysics. It is 
simply open whether the different microphysics in the closest (C4)-an-
tecedent worlds would support the chance of heads as it actually is or 
not. The chances might be the same, but they might also be different. 
Coming back to problem (4.2.2), consider an outstanding candidate 
for reducing the laws of thermodynamics, the Albert-Loewer recipe.29 It 
comprises: 
(i) the Newtonian dynamical law: F = ma; (ii) the Past Hypothesis: the 
initial conditions are low entropy; and (iii) the Statistical Postulate: there 
is a probability distribution uniform on the standard measure over those 
regions of phase space compatible with our empirical information.30 
Just for the sake of argument, I assume two things: the laws of ther-
modynamics can be reduced à la Albert-Loewer. And the Past Hypothesis 
is a fundamental law. Then the following should be rejected: 
(C9) If the Past Hypothesis had been violated, still the laws of thermo-
dynamics would not have been violated. 
For if we do not perfectly hold onto the Past Hypothesis, we do not have 
to hold onto what is explained by it. But Dunn seems committed to (C9). 
One concern will be discussed in appendix I. Now Dunn is critical of the 
Albert-Loewer recipe. He has a strategic motive for his criticism: if the 
Past Hypothesis is a fundamental law, the Elga world can be rejected for 
violating it. We do not need Dunn’s amendment. To counter this threat, 
Dunn voices doubts that the Past Hypothesis is a fundamental law. I will 
come back to these arguments below. Fundamental laws à la Lewis are 
confined to perfectly natural properties. Entropy is no such property. And 
fundamental laws are usually regarded as regularities. The Past Hypoth-
esis is no regularity.31 Be that as it may, I here use the Albert-Loewer 
29  cf. Albert, 2000, Loewer, 2012.
30  Schaffer, 2007, 122, cf. Dunn, 2011, 83.
31  cf. Dunn, 2011, 83–84, Callender, 2011.
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 3/5/20 6:25 PM
Kairos. Journal of Philosophy & Science 22, 2019
Center for the Philosophy of Sciences of Lisbon University
hould Special Science Laws Be Written into the Semantics of Counterfactuals?
99
recipe only by way of an example as an outstanding model of reduction. 
So if we do not principally eschew reduction of special science laws, any 
reductive efford could be used to underpin my argument.
There are two further problems. Both are mentioned but not thoroughly 
solved by Dunn. 
(4.2.3) I come to what could be the most grievous difficulty. For it is 
easily fleshed out in terms of individual counterfactuals. Contingent mat-
ters of fact might interfere with laws of the special sciences: 
«Grant that biology is a special science, and imagine that 
there was some critical event that occurred in the past, say 
a crucial step in the move toward DNA, in spacetime region 
R, that led biology on its current course. Let’s assume that 
had this particular critical event not occurred, then biology 
would have been very different. Now, consider the counter-
factual:
(L1) If lightning had struck in region R, then the laws of 
biology might have been very different. 
(L1) strikes us as true».32 
The problem (L1) poses is that in the standard Lewisian construal, it 
entails. 
(L3) It is not the case that if lightning had struck in region R, then the 
laws of biology would have been the same. 
This contradicts Dunn’s (4´). (4´) prescribes to hold onto the laws 
of biology. Dunn tries to avoid this result. He follows a suggestion of 
Lewis: sometimes read «might» as «it would be that: different laws are 
possible».33 To judge this proposal, we have to distinguish two cases. In 
one case (Case I), say where lightning directly strikes the critical event, 
the fundamental laws and the facts in the scenario entail different bio-
logical laws. 
32  Dunn, 2011, 92.
33  Dunn, 2011, 93.
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Then, Dunn concedes, we accept: 
(L4) If lightning had struck the critical event, then the biological laws 
would have been different. 
Thus, the laws might have been different, «might» understood in the 
standard way. There is another, more problematic case (Case II): the fun-
damental laws and the facts modified by lightning do not ensure which 
biological laws will come to obtain. How can such a situation be recon-
ciled with determinism? The antecedent is vague. Nothing precludes that 
two different small miracles lead to two different antecedent worlds, one 
with our biological laws, one with alien ones.34 In that situation, doctor-
ing the «might»-conditional won’t help. For we pace Dunn reject that 
the laws would have been the same. This clashes with Dunn’s explicit 
commitment to: 
(L2) If lightning had struck in region R, then the laws of biology would 
have been just as they actually are.35 
I discuss a possible reaction on Dunn’s behalf in appendix II. 
(4.2.4) I come to a difficulty of Dunn’s argument against Elga: we can-
not dispel the Elga world. It might exhibit more match in particular facts 
than Lewis’s candidate, divergence world W
2
. This can happen when the 
world has a beginning and stretches further into the future than into the 
past (relative to the time of convergence). As a remedy, Dunn gerryman-
ders a reading of the second criterion: «we do not quantitatively compare 
a region of past match with a region of future match».36 
There are two ways of fleshing out Dunn’s reading. The first is: assume 
that world A exhibits more perfect match with actuality in pre-antecedent 
facts but B exhibits more perfect match with actuality in post-antecedent 
facts. Then, other things being equal, both are equally similar to actual-
ity. The unfortunate consequence is this: for some A and B, there will be 
a world C. C fares even worse than A in perfect post-antecedent match 
but equals A in pre-antecedent match (assume a different small mira-
cle leads to larger regions of post-antecedent mismatch than the small 
34  Dunn presents a structurally analogous case (cf. Dunn, 2011, 95). 
35  Dunn, 2011, 92.
36  Dunn, 2011, 86.
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miracle by which A departs from actuality). As a consequence, C is as 
similar to actuality as B but less similar than A. To Lewis, the relations 
of overall similarity among worlds form a total preorder. A total preor-
der is transitive and complete.37 Since A and B are equally similar and 
so are B and C, by transitivity A and C must be equally similar. But C is 
less similar than A. 
The second way of putting Dunn’s interpretation is that A and B are 
incommensurable with regard to overall similarity.38 This conflicts with 
the completeness of the similarity ordering. If A and B qualify for overall 
similarity, either one is more similar or both are equally similar. Even 
if an account must ultimately be judged by its dealing with exemplary 
counterfactuals, the basic formal properties of the similarity relation are 
crucial to Lewis’s standard analysis of counterfactuals.39 Dunn’s proposal 
conflicts with these properties. 
5. The Limits of Elga’s Counterexample 
I think that Dunn’s strategy fails. But malgré lui, he teaches us an 
important lesson. Most people involved in the debate grant that Elga 
has devised a successful counterexample to Lewis’s metrics. But there 
are reasons for doubt Elga does not attend to. The success or failure 
of Elga’s argument depends on our explanation of the thermodynamic 
asymmetry.40 Many philosophers feel the need of an account in terms of 
fundamental physical laws. 
Let us consider an example:41 Dunn dismisses the possibility of using 
the Albert-Loewer recipe against Elga. Following the Albert-Loewer rec-
ipe, the Past Hypothesis (the initial conditions of the universe are low 
entropy) is treated as a law. Let us assume it is a fundamental law. Elga 
worlds would gravely violate that law and thus be ruled out from being 
37  cf. Lewis, 1973, 14.
38  cf. Morreau, 2010.
39  cf. Lewis, 1986, 41.
40  cf. Callender, 2011.
41  Another example would be a suitable version of the «General-Causal» approach. 
There is a fundamental mechanism which ensures that our world exhibits the thermody-
namic asymmetry (cf. North, 2002, 123). 
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closest by Lewis’s first criterion (no big miracles). For we have seen that 
the atypical region of reversed rotting rapidly grows the further we go 
back. So it leads to relatively widespread initial conditions which are not 
low entropy. 
However, Dunn presents two reasons why the Past Hypothesis cannot 
be a fundamental law: (i) the Past Hypothesis is no regularity. Thus it 
cannot be a law at all. (ii) Entropy is no perfectly natural but a high-level 
organizational property. Thus the Past Hypothesis cannot be a fundamen-
tal law.42 In reply to (i), the initial conditions of the universe are special. 
For instance, there is an intense debate on whether such conditions allow 
for explanation at all.43 Their peculiarity may be spelled out in funda-
mental terms. The Past Hypothesis may quantify over any situation, at 
any time, which displays those general fundamental properties which 
as a matter of fact only the initial conditions of the universe display. In 
quantifying over all times, it is a regularity, but a regularity whose only 
actual instantiation are the initial conditions of the universe. 
In reply to (ii): assume for the sake of argument that the Past Hypothe-
sis is a law. Then, says Dunn, it must be a special science law as it is not 
formulated in terms of perfectly natural properties. Take a disjunction 
of all fundamental ways of realising the property of low entropy. Given 
Dunn’s own account of special science laws, the fundamental law behind 
the Past Hypothesis may be expressed in terms of this disjunction. To 
Dunn, fundamental terms relate as follows to the less fundamental ones 
used in the special sciences:
«We have a special science law: 
SS-Law : Sx ⊃ S*x 
«S» and «S*» are predicates of a special science, so they 
refer to properties that are not perfectly natural. Thus, we 
can formulate all the ways to be S and all the ways to be 











x or . . . or P*
m
x.
42  Dunn, 2011, 83–84.
43  cf. Price, 2002.
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s can be thought of as an abbreviation 
for a longer specification of the pattern of instantiation of 
perfectly natural properties».44 
In this passage, Dunn wants to account for exceptions to the special 
science laws. But his template also fits exceptionless laws. The Past 
Hypothesis may be put as an exceptionless disjunctive law in terms of 
fundamental properties: let S be a disjunction of initial states of the uni-
verse which fulfil a general microphysical description (which only initial 
states satisfy). And let S* be the disjunction which spells out all funda-
mental ways of realizing low entropy.45
Given the doubts about the status of the Past Hypothesis, I close with 
a moderate claim: the success or failure of Elga’s example depends on 
whether there are fundamental natural laws which underlie the thermo-
dynamic asymmetry. If there are such laws, they can probably be used to 
rule out the Elga world as a competitor for closeness. So what concerns 
Elga’s egg, there is hope for Lewisian orthodoxy. Just as Lewis intimates, 
«counter-entropic funny-business makes for dissimilarity in the same 
way a big miracle does»: by violating the fundamental laws of nature 
on a large scale. I mention but cannot discuss a move that would allow 
us to simulate the effects of the assumption that the Past Hypothesis 
is a fundamental law without endorsing this hypothesis. The exclusion 
of counterentropical funny-business can be written into the semantics 
of counterfactuals.46 This leaves us with the following options in the 
neighbourhood of Lewis’s original criteria: first, amend the criteria by a 
clause which precludes post antecedent match from counting as far as it 
explanatorily depends on the antecedent. The cost is that the semantics 
depends on explanatory relations like causation. Second, accept that 
the Past Hypothesis is a fundamental law. The cost is that we lose the 
44  Dunn, 2011, 90.
45  For further discussion of objections to the Albert-Loewer recipe cf. the essays in 
Wilson, 2014, ch. 7–12). In particular, Albert tries to rebut the objection that the recipe 
allows for a localized backwards influence and thus cannot account for the sharpness of 
the opposition between past and future (Wilson, 2014, ch. 8). Albert replies that such an 
extremely local influence could not be of practical avail. Moreover, there are further sub-
stantial differences between our access to the past and our access to the future.
46  Bennett, 2003, 296, Williams, 2008.
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symmetry of laws and have to accept a somewhat strange law. Third, 
write it into the similarity criteria that counterentropical funny-business 
detracts from similarity. The consequence is that the criteria look more 
gerrymandered. I leave it to future debate which option will prevail.
Appendix I to 4.2.2 
Dunn distinguishes between violating the laws of thermodynamics and 
these laws not being laws at all.47 In the latter case, they are not violated. 
Lewis insists that a fundamental law which has an exception is not a law. 
Provided we follow Dunn that a law which is no law is not violated, the 
Past Hypothesis cannot be violated. 
(C9) If the Past Hypothesis had been violated, still the laws of thermo-
dynamics would not have been violated. 
(C9) is vacuously true. In this case, consider instead of (C9): 
(C9´) If the Past Hypothesis had not been a law, still the laws of ther-
modynamics would not have been violated. 
Again I think that (C9´) should be rejected; Dunn must accept it. For 
criterion (4´) requires us to hold onto the special science laws even if 
the fundamental laws are no laws. 
However, consider any situation where the Past Hypothesis is not a law. 
Shouldn’t we expect it to be a situation where the laws of thermodynam-
ics are no laws either (and thus are not violated)? I use the Elga world 
to conjure up a counterexample. By Dunn’s lights, it violates the laws 
of thermodynamics. To be violated these laws must be laws in the first 
place, says Dunn. In Elga’s vision, the infected region grows the further 
back we go in time. So we may construe the Elga world as follows: the 
Past Hypothesis is not a law at that world. In the infected region, initial 
conditions are not low entropy. However, in the regions surrounding the 
infected region, initial conditions are low entropy. And that is sufficient 
to ensure that the laws of thermodynamics are laws. Otherwise Dunn 
could not rule out the Elga world. Thus, the Elga world is a world where 
47  cf. my extensive discussion in appendix II, and Dunn, 2011, 94–95 foot-
note 33. 
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the Past Hypothesis is not a law but the laws of thermodynamics are vio-
lated, contrary to (C9´). Of course, there is no reason to deem the Elga 
world the closest world where the Past Hypothesis is no law. But some 
world like it is a good candidate. We cannot accept (C9´) as long as we 
cannot decide between two candidates for the closest worlds where the 
Past Hypothesis is not a law: a world where the laws of thermodynamics 
principally are laws but are violated; and a world where the laws of ther-
modynamics are no laws. 
Appendix II to 4.2.3 
In light of Dunn’s comments in his footnote 33, it is not clear that his 
account really commits him to (L2). 
(L2) If lightning had struck in region R, then the laws of biology would 
have been just as they actually are.48 
Footnote 33 presents a situation where the actual biological properties 
fail to be instantiated. As a consequence, the actual biological laws are 
no laws.49 Dunn insists that his criterion (4´) does not rule out such a 
world from being closest. Dunn is not committed to (L2) if the following 
holds: consider any lightning situation where the actual facts and the 
lightning together with the fundamental laws do not entail the actual 
biological laws. In such a situation, either the laws of biology are laws 
or they are no laws. 
This is literally right as far as (4´) demands that the laws of the special 
sciences should not be violated, not that they should be laws at all – but 
only given a specific reading of the criterion: a law is not violated if the 
properties to which it applies are never instantiated. Dunn must distin-
guish two kinds of situation: situations where the laws are not violated 
because they are no laws and situations where they are violated. Other-
wise laws, at least those of the special sciences, could not be violated at 
all. All possible situations whatsoever would fare equal with respect to 
Dunn’s (4´). The Elga world could not be ruled out. 
48  Dunn, 2011, 92.
49  cf. Dunn, 2011, 94–95.
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Consequently we can further develop my second lightning scenario 
(Case II) into two subcases: in one lightning scenario (Case II.I), the laws 
and the facts together only ensure that one of two alternatives will come 
to pass: either the actual laws of biology are laws and unviolated. Or they 
are no laws (and thus unviolated) because our biological properties are 
not instantiated. For that subcase, Dunn gets the right result: if the light-
ning situation had obtained, the actual laws would not have been violated 
but might have been no laws. Yet there is another subcase (Case II.II): in 
a different lightning scenario, the fundamental laws and the actual facts 
modified by lightning do not ensure that our biological laws will not be 
violated. For in that situation, our biological laws perfectly hold or they 
will be violated.50 Dunn must falsely maintain that if this situation had 
come to obtain, the laws of biology would not have been violated. 
To assess the possibility of (Case II.II), I take a closer look what it could 
mean to violate a law. By Lewis’s lights, there is no distinction between a 
fundamental law being violated and being no law. What concerns laws of 
the special sciences, things are more intricate. These laws permit excep-
tions. To fit Dunn’s needs, a violation must steer between an exception 
permitted by the laws and the laws being no laws. For instance, Dunn 
must prevent Elga from retorting: in the Elga world W
3
, the laws of ther-
modynamics are not violated because they are no laws. So Dunn must 
insist that in W
3
, the actual thermodynamic properties are instantiated 
although the infected region violates the laws of thermodynamics. 
In a parallel vein, Dunn must accept that the lightning scenario can be 





. Each is sufficient to bring about our biological properties and the 
concomitant laws. But assume that had lightning struck region R
1
, that 
region might have been infected by biological systems behaving devi-
antly. Deviant behaviour would have violated the actual laws of biology.51 
More precisely, the fundamental laws and the facts modified by lightning 
do not ensure that R
1
 would not have been infected. In one lightning sit-
50  We could also integrate the third alternative of the laws being no laws. 
51  One may doubt that such deviant biological systems are microphysically possible. 
But there will be other examples; one is my scenario of the Elga world conflicting with the 
Past Hypothesis such as to violate the laws of thermodynamics. 
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 would have been infected. In another, it would not have been. 
Dunn must accept. 
(L5) If lightning had occurred in region R
1
, the actual laws of biology 
would have gone unviolated. 
We should reject (L5). In sum, it does not help to introduce the pos-
sibility that laws are not violated because the respective properties are 
not instantiated at all. Note that my argument does not commit me to 
accepting the distinction of laws being violated or being no laws. I just 
point out what Dunn is committed to. 
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